- The budget of the United States of America shall be balanced on an annual basis, to wit expenditures and revenues shall be equal; except during periods Congressionally Declared Wars or by a vote of 4/5 of both Houses of Congress.
- The President of the United States shall have the power to veto specific lines of legislation without vetoing the entire legislation. A Proposed Balanced Budget Amendment drafted by the author of this essay.
Much of the anger that is directed towards our governing institutions deals with the lack of fiduciary oversight by Congress. There is a belief, that members of Congress, because of their longevity have lost sight of what is good for the nation and rather are more influence by local factions.
This not new, in fact Mr. Madison, writing as Publius in Federalists 10, wrote of the danger of factions, and that by creating our bi-cameral system, with the House elected by the people every two years, and the Senate elected indirectly by the people through the legislatures every six years (here I reference the means by which the Constitution provided prior to the ratification of the seventeenth amendment), there was means of controlling the ill effects of faction. There are those who argue that the current problem can be fixed only by a limit on the amount of time a member of congress may serve.
It is not the longevity of the individual members of Congress that is the problem; rather, it is the unrestrained power of the purse that is the problem. Unrestrained power corrupts the natural will of prudence and causes men of conservative temperament to act as if the laws of nature governing the economy of government do not apply to their actions.
It is as if the wisdom of the ages and sages may be forsaken to appease factions of the populace; factions that must be appeased out of necessity to ensure the members continued reelection by the people.
Our elected representatives have forsaken the commonweal of the nation for the commonweal of factions.
Balance may be restored by two methods. The first, and the least desirable is a restriction upon the number of terms a member of Congress may serve. But this does not serve the commonweal of the nation as it deprives the Congress of the wisdom of elders whose length of service has given them a greater understanding of the proper functioning of government. The second, and the one which is more desirable is to impose restraint upon the actions of the Congress and to give the executive a means of excising the most repugnant aspects of fiscal excess, a means of countering the narrow parochial interest of faction. This will enable the executive to limit what it finds fiscally objectionable while preserving the basic actions of Congress to improve the Commonweal of the collective body of the nation.
The proposal that should be brought forth for due consideration is intended to provide restraint to the natural inclination of human nature to wit to to please those our representatives serve by providing governmental largeness to them.
A failure to act on the part of the nation is only to admit that the perception that our governmental representatives have placed the interest of faction above the commonweal of the nation. A proposition I know is not true, but a perception that is hard to refute.